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Abstract
Digital rights management allows information owners to control the use and
dissemination of electronic documents via a machine-readable licence. Documents
are distributed in a protected form such that they may only be used with trusted en-
vironments, and only in accordance with terms and conditions stated in the licence.
Digital rights management has found uses in protecting copyrighted audio-visual
productions, private personal information, and companies’ trade secrets and in-
tellectual property. This chapter describes a general model of digital rights man-
agement together with the technologies used to implement each component of a
digital rights management system, and desribes how digital rights management
can be applied to secure the distribution of electronic information in a variety of
contexts.
1 Introduction
Advances in information and communication technologies and in particular digital rep-
resentation and processing of data together with the vast connectivity of the Internet,
has resulted in major challenges to the security of valuable multimedia works, private
data and sensitive corporate information. The owners of such information need protec-
tion against reproduction and/or distribution and use of the information beyond their
immediate control.
Digital representation of data allows perfect reproduction and reliable and efficient
storage and transmission. Digital representation of information also provides a unified
way of representing content and so possibility of creating high valued complex mul-
timedia objects such as a movie with accompanying sound track and commentaries.
Digital representation of data has resulted in a shift from paper based documentation
to electronic based documentations. Today electronic documents are the main form of
collecting, storing and communicating information within and outside organisations. A
particularly useful property of digital documents enhanced with meta data, data used to
explain data, is classification and search. Using the Internet connectivity digital objects
can be instantaneously delivered to users around the world hence providing opportunity
for new forms of business and distribution systems.
Traditional access control systems are able to limit access to electronic information
for particular individuals or groups, but are limited in their ability to control what those
individuals or groups do with that information once they had gained access to it. This
approach cannot provide adequate security for valuable contents such as copyrighted
multimedia.
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Around the middle of the 1990’s, systems such as DigiBox [102] and Cryptolope
[68] were gradually developed to allow information owners more control over distri-
bution of digital content in a paid form. Digibox is a set-top box that allows television
broadcasters to make their content selectively available to subscribers who have paid
for the content. Cryptographic envelopes, or “Cryptolopes”, were developed by IBM
for secure distribution of content. The content together with pricing information and
usage rules are transformed into an encrypted parcel which can be super-distributed.
The key can be separately obtained by the buyer of a Cryptolope. Mark Stefik of
Xerox envisioned an electronic world throughout which the flow of information was
controlled by “digital contracts” [105] (called licences in this chapter), and developed
the Digital Property Rights Language in which these contracts could be written. These
technologies came to be known as digital rights management.
Digital rights management technology has since become well-known for its role
in copyright protection for Internet music and video services, but is also becoming
important in the protection of sensitive corporate information [11] and is emerging as
a technology for protecting individuals’ private information [70].
The commonly used approach used in digital rights management systems is to as-
sociate the sensitive information with a licence. A licence sets out the rights that have
been granted to a user by the information’s owner in a machine-readable and (typi-
cally) machine-enforceable fashion. The user may only access the information using a
combination of hardware and software whose trustworthiness has been proven to the in-
formation owner, and which will only permit the user to exercise rights that are granted
by a licence. Section 2 presents a reference model for a digital rights management
system and its components.
Persistent nature of protection in DRM system implies that a digital object must
not leave the system governed by the DRM. This means that all terminals that use the
object (e.g. play a music clip) must have the trusted hardware and software and be able
to enforce the licence. This makes inter-operability between digital rights manage-
ment systems created by different vendors a particularly difficult challenge in digital
rights management. Section 3 outlines approaches to inter-operability in digital rights
management, and describes some of the major specifications in the field.
Section 4 outlines how digital rights management systems can be applied to pro-
tecting copyrighted commercial multimedia; sensitive corporate or government infor-
mation; private personal information; user-generated content; and personal health in-
formation.
A complete digital rights management system requires a number of components
to be implemented, including a trusted computing base; rights negotiation; a rights
interpereter; cryptographic operations and other supporting technology. Approaches to
implementing these are discussed in Section 5.
Digital rights management remains a relatively immature and controversial tech-
nology, particularly in its application to copyright protection. The “closed world” ap-
proach in which every right must be explicitly stated in a licence has drawn much
criticism as eroding users’ rights under copyright law. We conclude the chapter with a
discussion of this and other outstanding issues and challenges in digital rights manage-
ment in Section 6.
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Figure 1: The components of a digital rights management system.
2 The Digital Rights Management Model
Digital rights management has many similarities to traditional access control, but re-
quires that information must remain protected even when transported beyond the bound-
ary of systems controlled by the information owner. Digital rights management can
thus be defined as “persistent access control” [13], as distinguished from traditional
access control systems that cannot (technologically) compel users to conform to any
particular usage policy once they have been granted access to a piece of information.
Digital rights management allows protected information to be transmitted over an
insecure channel and stored on an insecure storage device without compromising the
integrity and confidentiality of the information. For example, information can be dis-
tributed via a direct network connection, a file-sharing network, or by copying it onto
transportable media; and stored on a file server, an individual computer’s hard drive, or
removable media.
2.1 Reference Model
Figure 1 shows our reference model for a digital rights management system. Informa-
tion is created by a provider, and transmitted in a protected (for example, encrypted)
form to a user via some distribution channel. In order to access the protected data, the
user must obtain a licence from the licence issuer.
Licences are written in a machine-readable rights expression language that sets out
the terms of use of the data and the information required to access the protected content.
We will discuss rights expression languages in more detail in Section 2.4.
The fundamental security requirement for a DRM system is that the hardware
and/or software used to access protected data be guaranteed by its manufacturer to
behave in accordance with licences; it effectively performs the role of the “reference
monitor” in traditional access control systems. For the purposes of this chapter, a DRM
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Figure 2: The components of a DRM agent.
agent is an abstract single-user player, editor, or similar that may be implemented as a
hardware device, a software application or combination of the two. We will discuss the
general form of such devices and applications presently, and discuss their implementa-
tion in Section 5.1.
2.2 DRM Agents
Figure 2 shows our reference model for a DRM agent. When a user wishes to perform
some particular action on a particular item of data, the decision point checks that the
user possesses a licence that permits that action. It further checks that the licence has
been signed by a recognised licence issuer, and that any conditions associated with
the permission are satisfied. If a suitable licence does not exist, or the conditions are
not satisfied, the decision point will refuse to carry out the operation. Otherwise, the
enforcement point will be permitted to retrieve the data key, and the renderer enabled
to carry out the desired operation.
2.3 Authorised Domains
Early digital rights management systems only allowed licences to be addressed to a
single DRM agent, so that a user who bought some multimedia could only access that
multimedia on a single device. Most realistic users, however, have more than one
device on which they would like to access information.
Newer digital rights management systems support users with multiple devices by
way of an authorised domain. An authorised domain is a group of DRM agents to
which licences to use information can be issued, such that all of the members of a
domain can access the information without requiring information to be licensed to
each agent individually. DRM agents may join and leave a domain independently of
any licences issued to the domain.
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Figure 3: An authorised domain.
In most systems, a device may join a domain by engaging in a cryptographic pro-
tocol with a domain controller that is responsible for the domain. If the device is
accepted into the domain, it will receive some cryptographic information that enables
it to decrypt the cryptographic information in a licence awarded to that domain.
The conditions under which a device may join a domain vary from system. Some
early systems simply fix an upper bound on the number of devices permitted in a do-
main [9, 86], with the expectation that this number would be chosen to represent the
upper limit of the number of devices owned by a single household. Other systems
use the licence issuer as the domain controller [84], so that the rights-holder is able
to determine directly what devices should be members of a domain. Some more re-
cent authors have suggested that membership be controlled by some machine-readable
policy transmitted from the rights-holder to the domain controller [72, 101, 77].
2.4 Rights Expression Languages
A licence is written in a machine-readable rights expression language that describes
the conditions under which the associated information may be used.
The rights expression languages most commonly used in the open literature take the
form of a series of access control rules, broadly similar to those used in access control
languages such as the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (“XACML”) [85].
A licence written in these kinds of languages can be modelled as a contract between
a licensor (who controls the information to which it refers) and a licensee [58, 13]. A
licence consists of
• the identitities of the licensor, licensee and any third parties to the agreement;
• the resources, that is, items of information, to which the agreement refers; and
• an agreement that lists all of the permissions that the licensor has granted to the
licensee.
Each permission may subject to an arbitrary number of
• constraints that must be satisfied before the permission can be exercised, for
example, it may only be exercised before a given expiry date; and/or
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Licensor: Alice
Licensee: Bob
Resource: Song 1
Agreement
Permission: play
Constraint: at home
Permission: burn
Obligation: pay $1
Figure 4: A licence issued by Alice to Bob, in which she has agreed that Bob can play
“Song 1” only if he is at home, and that he must pay her $1 for every copy that he burns
to CD.
• obligations that are incurred by exercising the permission, for example, each
exercise must be logged.
Figure 4 shows an example licence set out in this form.
3 Standardisation and Inter-operability
Digital rights management presents a particularly difficult challenge for universal dis-
tribution and access to the content. In the following we will focus on technological
challenges for inter-operability. Other important aspects are legal and financial impli-
cations of allowing content that is protected under one DRM system to be used under
a second DRM system. In practice an inter-operability framework addressing these
issues must be in place [91].
DRM-protected information is distributed in a protected form that is, by design,
inaccessible to any entity that does not conform to the DRM vendor’s specification.
Therefore, users may not be able to make use of information on DRM agents supporting
a different DRM regime, even if they have legitimately acquired the information and
the second DRM agent is from a reputable vendor otherwise trusted by the original
information provider.
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Koenen, et al. [71] suggest three approaches to creating inter-operable DRM sys-
tems:
Full-format inter-operability. All protected information conforms to some globally
standardised format.
Configuration-driven inter-operability. End-user devices can acquire the ability to
process information protected by any DRM regime by downloading appropriate
“tools”.
Connected inter-operability. On-line third parties are used to translate operations
from one DRM regime to another.
Numerous bodies from industry and elsewhere have proposed standards for both
complete digital rights management systems, and components of such systems.
3.1 Full-Format Inter-operability
Full-format inter-operability would clearly provide the most convenience for informa-
tion users, affording them the same convenience that they enjoy when using standard-
ised unprotected formats such as the compact disc. However, it is not easy to define
a single standard that is appropriate for all conceivable DRM agents. Furthermore, a
breach in the security of the standardised regime could be catastrophic and standards
bodies are not typically able to move with the speed required to effectively respond to
security breaches.
Full-format specifications include
• the Open Mobile Alliance’s Digital Rights Management Specification (“OMA
DRM”) [84] for mobile phones and similar devices, which provides a simple
digital rights management system based on a simplified form of the Open Digital
Rights Language;
• the Marlin Developer Community’s Core System Specification [77] for con-
sumer electronics devices, which is based on the Networked Environment for
Media Orchestration (“NEMO”) developed by Intertrust [19];
• the Digital Video Broadcasting Project’s Content Protection and Copy Manage-
ment Specification (“DVB-CPCM”) [41] for digital television systems;
• the Secure Video Processor (“SVP”) Alliance’s Open Content Protection Sys-
tem [96] for hardware video decoders that receive protected video from other
conditional access or digital rights management systems;
• the security chapter of the Digital Cinema Initiative’s Digital Cinema System
Specification [37], which defines the measures to be taken to prevent the leakage
of digital films from cinemas; and
• Project DReaM [109], an attempt to develop an open-source digital rights man-
agement regime sponsored by Sun Microsystems under the name “Open Media
Commons”.
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3.2 Configuration-Driven Inter-operability
Configuration-driven inter-operability attempts to provide flexibility and renewability
by allowing DRM agents to dynamically configure themselves with the appropriate
digital rights management regime for any protected information that they download.
However, it is not clear that all DRM agents will necessarily be capable of accessing
all tools (which might only be available for one particular computing platform, for
example) or have the resources to store and execute all of the tools required to access
all of the protected information accessed by one user.
The MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework (ISO/IEC 21000), for example, includes
three parts devoted to a configuration-driven rights management scheme:
• the Intellectual Property Management and Protection (“IPMP”) Components
[63], which describe methods for associating protected resources with IPMP
tools that implement the specifics of a proprietary digital rights management
system;
• the Rights Expression Language (“MPEG REL”) [64] that will be described in
Section 3.4.2 of this chapter; and
• the Rights Data Dictionary [65] that provides an ontology for describing rights
management activities.
The IPMP Components are the MPEG-21 version of the earlier “IPMP Extensions” de-
veloped for MPEG-4 [67], which provide the same functionality for MPEG-4 systems.
Variants of the IPMP Components and MPEG REL are also used in the “Inter-operable
DRM Platform” promulgated by the Digital Media Project [39].
3.3 Connected Inter-operability
The OMA DRM, Marlin, DVB-CPCM and SVP Alliance specifications all contain ad
hoc provisions for importing or exporting protected information to or from other dig-
ital rights management systems. The Coral Consortium, however, defines a complete
framework for connected inter-operability based on the Networked Environment for
Media Orchestration (“NEMO”) [19] (which is also used by Marlin). Coral’s specifi-
cation defines a series of roles such as rights exporter, content mediator, and so on, in
terms of a set of services that a device must implement in order to play that role. If
the vendor of a particular digital rights management system implements all of the nec-
essary roles for that system, that system is then able to exchange rights and protected
information with other digital rights management systems for which corresponding
roles have been implemented.
3.4 Rights Expression Languages
Two widely-known languages of the kind described in Section 2.4 are:
• the Open Digital Rights Language (“ODRL”) [83]; and
• the eXtensible Rights Markup Language (“XrML”) [29], together with its close
descendent the MPEG Rights Expression Language (“MPEG REL”) [64].
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3.4.1 ODRL
The Open Digital Rights Language is developed and promulgated by the ODRL Ini-
tiative as an alternative to proprietary languages. Version 1.1 of the language was
released in 2002, and work on Version 2.0 was under way at the time of writing. A
highly simplified form of Version 1.1 is used in the Open Mobile Alliance’s digital
rights management specification.
ODRL is structured as a set of rights to perform some permission over some asset.
The rights may represent an offer to obtain the rights, or an agreement that the rights
have been granted to some party. The permission may be associated with some con-
straints that restrict the conditions under which the permission is granted, and some re-
quirements (re-named duties in working drafts of ODRL v2.0) that must be performed
if the action is carried out.
In ODRL v1.1, all permissions are assumed to be denied unless they are granted by
a rights document. Working drafts of ODRL v2.0, however, do not make this assump-
tion and instead allow rights to contain prohibitions that explicitly prohibit actions.
Figure 5 shows an example ODRL v1.1 rights document. This document represents
an agreement with Ernie Smith – identified by his X.500 directory entry – and allows
him to make use of a resource identified as doi:1.23456/video/0, which is a
collection of video trailers found at http://www.sallys.com.au/trailers.
The agreement permits him to play the videos in the collection for a cumulative total
of thirty minutes.
3.4.2 XrML and MPEG REL
The eXtensible Rights Markup Language is the direct descendent of the Digital Prop-
erty Rights Language (“DPRL”) [116], developed by Mark Stefik at Xerox very early
in the history of digital rights management. Xerox later spun off XrML to a com-
pany known as ContentGuard. XrML, with some modifications, was standardised by
the Motion Picture Experts Group (“MPEG”) as ISO/IEC 21000-5. In this form it is
known as the MPEG Rights Expression Language.
An XrML licence is structured as a collection of grants issued by some licence
issuer. Each grant awards some right over some specified resource to a specified prin-
cipal, that is, user of a resource. Each grant may be subject to a condition, such that
the right contained in the grant may not be exercised unless the condition is satisfied.
XrML conditions include both constraints that must be satisfied before an action is
commenced, and obligations that are incurred by performing the action. All rights are
denied unless they are explicitly permitted by a licence.
Figure 6 shows an example XrML grant for a scenario similar to the one we used for
our ODRL example earlier. The grant is awarded to the principal who holds a private
key corresponding an RSA public key given in the XML Signature format, and permits
this principal to play videos identified as urn:sallys.com.au:trailers for a
cumulative total of thirty minutes.
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<o-ex:rights>
<o-ex:agreement>
<o-ex:party>
<o-ex:context>
<o-dd:uid>x500:c=AU;o=Registry;cn=Ernie Smith</o-dd:uid>
</o-ex:context>
<o-ex:asset>
<o-ex:context>
<o-dd:uid>doi:1.23456/video/0</o-dd:uid>
<o-dd:dLocation>
http://www.sallys.com.au/trailers
</o-dd:dLocation>
</o-ex:context>
</o-ex:asset>
<o-ex:permission>
<o-dd:play>
<o-ex:constraint>
<o-ex:accumulated>30M</o-ex:accumulated>
</o-ex:constraint>
</o-dd:play>
</o-ex:permission>
</o-ex:agreement>
</o-ex:rights>
Figure 5: An ODRL v1.1 agreement.
<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder>
<r:info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>
<dsig:Modulus>d5E73p==</dsig:Modulus>
<dsig:Exponent>Aw==</dsig:Exponent>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</r:info>
</r:keyHolder>
<mx:play/>
<mx:diReference>
<mx:identifier>urn:sallys.com.au:trailers</mx:identifier>
</mx:diReference>
<sx:validityTimeMetered>30M</sx:validityTimeMetered>
</r:grant>
Figure 6: An XrML grant.
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3.4.3 Other Approaches
While ODRL, XrML and their relatives are the most prominent rights expression mech-
anisms in the open literature, a number of other languages following similar principles
have been proposed to meet the needs of particular industries, including
• the Serial Copy Management System (“SCMS”) developed for managing copies
of digital audio tapes;
• the Picture Licensing Universal System (“PLUS”) [111] developed for use in the
image licensing industry;
• the Creative Commons’ “digital code” [34] for encoding usage and distribution
rights for freely distributable works; and
• the Automated Content Access Protocol (“ACAP”) [2] developed for communi-
cating rights to Internet search engines.
Other approaches have been proposed in which permissions are checked by exe-
cuting a set of instructions rather than by interpreting a statement of the rights that are
available to a beneficiary.
In the LicenseScript language proposed by Chong, et al. [25], a licence is expressed
as a triple of a resource, a set of clauses and a set of bindings. The bindings store the
state information of the licence, such as the name of the beneficiary, the number of
times a particular permission can be exercised, and so on. Each clause is a logical
expression that, if true, permits some operation to be performed. When a user wishes
to perform an operation, a licence interpreter executes a query on the relevent clause
and, if the result is true, returns a new licence reflecting any changes to the bindings.
For example, the new licence may have the available number of operations reduced by
one compared to the original licence. Chong, et al. argue that LicenseScript is more
expressive than ODRL and XrML.
The system proposed by the Marlin Joint Development Association uses “control
objects” (equivalent to licences in our model) written in an executable bytecode lan-
guage called Plankton. Each DRM agent contains a Plankton virtual machine, and each
control object contains a series of Plankton routines that the DRM agent must execute
in order to perform actions. For example, a control object for a movie might include
a Control.Actions.PLAY.Perform routine that determines whether or not the
DRM agent has permission to play the movie.
3.5 Other Components
Numerous other industry bodies have developed specifications for some component of
a digital rights management system; for example,
• the Content Scrambling System (“CSS”) [42] and Advanced Access Content
System (“AACS”) [5] are used on DVDs and HD-DVDs, respectively, to restrict
playback of DVDs to approved DVD players;
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• High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (“HDCP”) [38] is used to prevent
high-definition signals from being captured between an audio decoder and speak-
ers, or a video decoder and a display;
• Content Protection for Removable Media (“CPRM”) [1] specifies a method for
binding protected files to removable media; and
• Digital Transmission Content Protection (“DTCP”) [40] specifies a method for
protecting content transmitted over computer system buses.
4 Applications
4.1 Copyright Protection
Digital rights management was originally developed in order to control the distribution
of copyrighted material through electronic channels. Publishing companies foresaw
increasing network capacity and improving compression algorithms ushering in an era
in which unprotected, high-quality music, video and other commercial publications
could be freely distributed without recompense to the publisher.
Digital rights management addresses the problem by making licences the subject
of trade, rather than the publication itself. While music, video and text files can be
freely distributed in their protected forms, users wishing to make use of these files must
purchase a licence enabling their DRM agent or authorised domain to access the file.
Since licences cannot be transferred except within an authorised domain, the publisher
is able to make sales commensurate with the number of people using their publications.
Publishers and retailers have used a number of different business models supported
by digital rights management to varying degrees, and further models have been pro-
posed by academic and other observers.
Pay-per-download. The pay-per-copy model used for physical media such as books,
compact discs, etc. can be replicated in an electronic market by having a licence issuer
create licences in return for a fee. The buyer must supply the identity of the DRM agent
or authorised domain to which the licence is to be issued, together with the identifier of
the multimedia work that he or she wishes to buy, and the rights that he or she wishes
to obtain. The licence can then create a valid licence matching these identifiers, and
transfer it to the buyer in exchange for payment.
Subscription. Subscriptions and compulsory licensing allow users to freely access
some pool of multimedia works so long as they are paid members of a service. An
obvious way to implement such services in a digital rights management model would
be to make service members into the members of an authorised domain that is able to
access all of the multimedia on offer. Another approach, which does not require devices
to support authorised domains, is to allow the devices to download a licence with every
song that they download, and have the licence expire at the end of the subscription
period. Renewing the subscription causes the licences to be refreshed. Other proposals
include mechanisms by which multimedia owners are compensated according to the
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number of times their works are used or transferred within the domain [43], which can
be done in a digital rights management model using a licence containing an obligation
to report any use or transfer of the accompanying work.
Pay-per-play and rental. Highly-connected devices allow multimedia owners to
charge for every individual use of their works (presumably at a considerably lower
rate than what they would charge to purchase a copy outright). This can be done with-
out digital rights management by streaming a copy of the work from a central server
and using trusted computing techniques (see Section 5.1) to prevent the player from
recording the stream to local storage. Digital rights management, however, allows a
copy to be stored and used locally while payment is enforced by constraints or obli-
gations in the licence. A strict pay-per-play model can be implemented by associating
the licence with a payment obligation, or users can pre-purchase uses in the form of
licences that are constrained to a fixed number of uses. Users can also rent works in
the form of licences constrained to a fixed time period.
Try-before-you-buy. Multimedia creators often promote their works by allowing
some limited access to their works without charge, in the hope that users will decide
to purchase works that they like after being exposed to them. Sample items can be
created in a digital rights management model in the form of a free licence constrained
to a certain number of uses, or a fixed time period. If the user then decides to buy the
work, he or she can purchase an unrestricted licence.
4.1.1 Computer Gaming and Copyrighted Software
Copyright protection has a long history in the computer software industry – notably
for games – that has developed largely independently from digital rights management
systems for music, video and other multimedia. Techniques have included
• providing a unique installation code with each legal copy of a piece of software,
which must be entered during installation and registered with an on-line server;
• requiring the original installation media (floppy disk or CD), or a specially-made
hardware “dongle”, to be inserted into the computer in order to use the software;
• requiring the user to type in words or codes from a printed manual shipped with
the game;
• distributing games on specialised hardware modules that are difficult to duplicate
and can only be used on gaming consoles; and
• the use of centralised licence servers that require client software to regularly
authenticate itself.
Digital rights management approaches of the kind described in this chapter can be
applied to computer software in much the same way as they are to general multimedia
works. The OMA Digital Rights Management standard for mobile devices [84], for
example, can be applied to games on mobile devices. Very little technical information
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is publicly available, however, about the proprietry systems used for protecting games
on general computing platforms.
4.2 Enterprise DRM
The use of digital rights management to protect and track enterprises’ sensitive in-
formation – known as “enterprise DRM” – has received considerably less attention
than copyright protection in the open literature. Interest in this application is growing
rapidly, however, and several enterprise DRM systems are now available on the market.
Enterprise proprietary information includes the intellectual property owned by the
company, users’ data and a range of documents that are used by employees. Tradi-
tional methods of access control, such as file encryption or database access control
mechanisms, limit access to authorised employees of the company but do not provide
protection against employees’ misuse of their rights. An employee may illegally copy
a file after it is decrypted, or transfer it outside the organisation or to another employee
in the company who is not authorised to access the file, by sending it as an attachment
to an email. Enterprise DRM systems address this problem by providing persistent
protection of enterprise information.
Arnab and Hutchison [11] give a list of requirements for enterprise DRM based on
the three most prominent systems on the market at the time (2005) – Microsoft’s Rights
Management Services [79], Authentica’s Active Rights Management (since bought by
EMC and re-named Documentum Information Rights Management [44]) and Adobe’s
LiveCycle [4]. These products allow users to restrict access to documents to authorised
users; place expiry times on documents after which they cannot be accessed; prevent
sensitive documents from being e-mailed out of the company; and so on.
Arnab and Hutchison identify
• persistent protection, that is, the fundamental requirement of all digital rights
management systems that protected information cannot pass outside an ecosys-
tem of trusted DRM agents;
• support for inter-company transactions; and
• portability, that is, the ability to access protected information in a variety of
different locations, formats, and computing platforms.
as the top three requirements for an enterprise DRM system. They also identify re-
quirements over and above those widely used in copyright protection systems, such
as
• an “excerpt” right that allows a file to be broken into smaller pieces and inserted
into different documents;
• transfer rights that enable companies to share their intellectual property with
partner companies; and
• usage tracking to enable auditing and detect illicit activities.
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The first two requirements appear to be challenging and have not been widely addressed
in the open literature, while the latter is easier to implement but but may present a
challenge to employees’ privacy.
4.3 Privacy Protection
A number of authors have recognised for some time that there is a duality between
protection of private information, and protection of copyrighted material: in both cases,
we have a provider who wishes to make some information available to a third party in
return for some financial reward or service, but does not wish to make the information
publicly available [119, 70].
In a privacy protection context, the provider is a data subject whose privacy is at
stake should an item of data be misused in some way. A data user may require access
to the data for some purpose, such as completing a transaction requested by the data
subject. In order to gain access to the data, the data user must obtain a licence from the
licence issuer. Licences issued by the licence issuer are controlled in some way by the
data subject, either directly or by having the issuer act according to a policy supplied
by the data subject. The data user can then access the data according to the terms of
the licence.
Early systems based on this principle enlisted the policy language defined by the
Platform for Privacy Preferences (“P3P”) [114] as a rights expression language [23,
24]. P3P is not designed to support automated enforcement, however, and later sys-
tems introduced hybrids of P3P and XrML [56, 93] or extended forms of MPEG REL
[100]. Other DRM-like systems support very limited rights expressions using their own
notation [22, 61].
The digital rights management model provides a straightforward way of imple-
menting the “sticky policy” paradigm [69]. The sticky policy paradigm requires that
private information be protected according to the policy that was in force at the time
it was collected, even if the organisation that collected the data has since changed its
policy, or the data has been transferred to another organisation. In a digital rights man-
agement approach, the sticky policy is simply a licence.
4.4 User-Generated Content
“User-generated content”, that is, multimedia works produced and made available by
non-commercial authors, has gained great prominence in recent years and presents a
new environment in which digital rights management might be applied. The need for
protection in user-generated content cuts across
• copyright protection for amateur (but possibly would-be professional) authors
hoping to maintain some control over commercial use their work; and
• privacy protection for users of social networking sites who wish to maintain some
control over the information that they make available on their web pages.
Digital rights management has not yet received much attention in this area, though
Conrado, et al. have shown how one copyright-protection digital rights management
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system might be extended for user-generated content [28]. The Creative Commons
movement has also taken some steps towards introducing (copyright) rights manage-
ment to non-commercial authors in the form of licences that can be expressed in digital
code [34, 32], but little work appears to be done on the issue of enforcement of these
licences.
4.5 Healthcare
Petkovic´, et al. examine the potential for digital rights management technology in se-
curing electronic healthcare records [87]. They argue that digital rights management
technologies already provide many of the features desired in secure electronic health-
care system, but identify a number of points on which existing digital rights manage-
ment systems (specifically, those originally designed for enterprise rights management)
do not meet these needs, including:
• the parties that access and manipulate documents may come from many different
domains and it is difficult to predict in advance who these parties might be;
• the ownership of data is not clearly defined, as it is shared between healthcare
workers and patients;
• access rights are highly context-dependent and are difficult to determine auto-
matically (for example, are we in an emergency situation?);
• small fragments of records (and not just whole documents, as is usually the case
in copyright and enterprise protection) may be critical;
• the membership of roles can change very quickly;
• healthcare data may be used for research purposes in an anonymised form; and
• healthcare data is prone to numerous inference channels.
5 Implementing Digital Rights Management
5.1 Trusted Computing
The information owner in the digital rights management model wants to deliver infor-
mation to an end-user who is not necessarily trusted with that information. Since the
human user of the information is not trusted to behave in the way desired by the in-
formation owner, digital rights management requires some kind of trusted computing
environment that prevents users of computer systems from tampering with the rights
enforcement mechanism.
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5.1.1 Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation techniques attempt to transform a section of executable code into
another section of code, such that the second code performs the same function as the
first but cannot be understood by an attacker. A vendor can implement a trusted en-
vironment by only distributing the environment’s code (or critical sections of it) in an
obfuscated form. If attackers are unable to understand and modify this code, it can be
trusted to perform the function for which it was designed.
Numerous techniques have been developed for obfuscating code; a comprehensive
survey can be found in [118].
Many obfuscated pieces of software have been successfully reverse-engineered by
attackers with sufficient time and skill, and in fact Barak, et al. have shown that it is
not possible to construct a universal obfuscator in their “virtual black box” model [15].
Nonetheless, some positive results are also available in other settings [75, 115], and
code obfuscation forms the basis of many practical digital rights management systems
where other techniques are unavailable or too expensive.
5.1.2 Tamper-Resistant Hardware
A wide variety of hardware devices have been designed to provide a physical environ-
ment in which sensitive code can be executed without being observed or modified [6].
These kinds of devices are frequently used to implement digital rights management
systems in consumer electronics devices, such as mobile phones and DVD players, and
may have their security properties specified by the standards body responsible for the
digital rights management system.
5.1.3 Operating System Support
While current commodity operating systems for general-purpose computers do not pro-
vide trusted computing environments suitable for use by digital rights management
systems, researchers have proposed a number of methods by which such trusted com-
puting features could be added to these kinds of systems (not only for the use of digital
rights management systems).
Given the difficulty of completely securing a legacy operating system and all of
the legacy applications that run upon it, trusted computing environments are typically
implemented as a “security kernel” within the host operating system. The security
kernel is isolated from the rest of the operating system and insecure applications, and
may provide
• a range of primitives with which a trusted application can be built [45, 14]; or
• a complete trusted virtual machine [54, 108, 31].
The security kernel itself must be secured using a tamper-resistant hardware com-
ponent such as a cryptographic co-processor or Trusted Platform Module, described in
the next section.
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5.1.4 The Trusted Computing Group
The Trusted Computing Group has proposed specifications for a hardware component
known as a trusted platform module that provides support for verifying the integrity of
a computer system [112]. The trusted platform module is a computer chip that cannot
be easily removed or tampered with, and allows for the integrity of its host computer
system to be checked and attested to.
The phrase “digital rights management” is conspicuously absent from the Trusted
Computing Group’s own literature, and some claim that the chips do not provide ad-
equate physical security in the digital rights management context [92]. Nonetheless,
many commentators believe that trusted platform modules are the beginning of a new
era of hardware-based digital rights management systems [7, 51]; and a number of au-
thors have proposed and/or implemented actual digital rights management and similar
systems based on the trusted platform module [76, 90, 94, 104, 117]. Even if existing
trusted platform modules do not provide sufficient levels of physical security for some
digital rights management applications, it is easy to see how a secured module with the
same functions could be used to produce a secure trusted environment.
The trusted platform module controls the start-up procedure of its host computer
system in such a way as to ensure that the configuration of the system cannot be
changed without being noted. For every piece of executable code used during start-
up, the trusted platform module computes a “metric” that uniquely identifies that code,
and stores it inside memory that cannot be accessed by software running on the host
computer system. If a component of the host computer system is changed, its metric
will also change.
The trusted platform module can attest to the configuration of its host computer sys-
tem by providing its metrics and a proof that these metrics were computed by a trusted
platform module. If a second computer system has access to a set of metrics that it be-
lieves to represent a trusted configuration of the first computer system, attestation can
be used to check whether or not the first computer system is still in that configuration,
or has been altered to be in some possibly malicious configuration.
5.1.5 Certification
The problem of determining whether or not a computing environment is a trusted one
appears to have drawn little attention in the open literature. It is possible, in princi-
ple, to check the claim of a trusted computing using some public key infrastructure in
which every trusted computing device is represented. However, there may be a number
challenges in maintaining such an infrastructure [46]:
• By whom and by what procedure are components tested to ensure that they are
suitably trustworthy?
• How will this procedure scale to thousands of components in millions of possible
combinations?
• Will the need for authentication (possibly deliberately) impede inter-operability
between components form different manufacturers?
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5.2 Rights Negotiation
Many existing systems (whether based on digital rights management or other technolo-
gies) only allow for users to offer or obtain rights to information on a take-or-leave-it
basis:
• in electronic commerce, a user can either purchase a given licence for the price
offered, or not purchase one at all; or
• in the Platform for Privacy Preferences, a user can supply information to be
governed by some given privacy policy, or not supply it at all.
Digital rights management, however, allows for more sophisticated models in which
different sets of rights over a work might be offered for sale at different prices, or indi-
vidual users might negotiate a distribution policy for an item of information according
to their particular circumstances.
In the simplest case, a user might be offered a selection of a small number of pre-
prepared “instant licences” that describe particular well-known modes of use [62]. In
electronic commerce, for example, a work might be offered for sale under three differ-
ent licences aimed at three different market segments: a basic usage licence for users
who want to use the work for their personal enjoyment; a distribution licence for re-
tailers who want to on-sell the work; or a composition licence for authors who want to
incorporate the work into larger works.
This approach can be made more flexible by considering a prospective licence as
a series of independent “instant grants” that can be accepted or rejected individually
using checkboxes or similar mechanisms. In an electronic commerce scenario, each
grant may represent some particular use of the object such as “the work may be used
in advertising” or “the work may be printed”, and be associated with an individual cost
[98]. In a privacy scenario, each grant may represent whether or not the information
owner wishes to be added to a mailing list, participate in research, etc. [100, 93].
More complex negotiation protocols allow the information provider and user to
reach an agreement through several exchanges of offers and counter-offers [36, 10, 12].
The offers and counter-offers may be constructed by human negotiators (presumably
using some tool for constructing machine-readable licences), or by automated software
agents [106, 35, 53].
Existing rights expression languages do not contain explicit support for negotiation
protocols. Arnab and Hutchison propose to extend the Open Digital Rights Language in
order for it to express “requests”, “offers”, “acceptances” and “rejections” for particular
sets of rights [12], so that it can be used as part of a negotiation protocol. Jamkhedkar,
et al., however, argue that these primitives are better incorporated into an REL-agnostic
negotiation protocol [66].
5.3 Rights Interpreters
Whether or not a given licence grants a particular permission in particular circum-
stances can be checked in a relatively straightforward way by constructing a logical
model of the licence at run-time and executing a logical querying on it [58].
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Rights expression languages, however, allow for very complex expressions to be
built up by making the validity of one licence depend on the validity of another licence
or other external piece of information. Authorised domains provide a simple example:
a DRM agent that possesses a licence awarded to an authorised domain must check a
second licence (or equivalent information) to see that it is a member of that authorised
domain prior to using the licence.
Such chains of licences are particularly prominent in XrML and MPEG REL, where
they are referred to as authorisation proofs. Given a user request to perform an action it
is not, in general, obvious how the decision point might construct a valid authorisation
proof, if it exists. Wiessman and colleagues argue that the problem of testing for the
existence of an authorisation proof for a particular right given a set of licences is,
in fact, undecidable for XrML [59] and NP-hard for ODRL [88] though polynomial-
time algorithms exist for versions of both languages with some troublesome features
removed.
Authorisation proofs can be constructed by inference engines or similar techniques
[16, 107, 99]. Licences are represented as statements in some logic and an authorisa-
tion request is viewed as a theorem to be proved using those statements. The provers
construct a proof in a series of steps in which the engine examines a claim and proceeds
by attempting to prove all of the claims on which the current claim depends.
Proponents of the alternative rights expression methods embodied in Marlin and
LicenseScript argue that reasoning about the XML-based languages is complex and
expensive [25]. In their systems, licences are expressed in a procedural form that can
executed by a Plankton (for Marlin) or Prolog (for LicenseScript) interpreter. The cre-
ators of LicenseScript, in fact, suggest that LicenseScript could be used as a compiled
form of XrML or ODRL that would be more amenable to executation on small devices.
5.4 Supporting Technologies
5.4.1 Cryptography
The primary tools for securing distribution of electronic content are encryption, mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC) and digital signature [78]. Encryption schemes are
transformations applied to the message so that the message is concealed and is accessi-
ble only to those who have the correct decryption key. In DRM systems the encrypted
content can be super-distributed and the decryption key be delivered as part of the li-
cense to a specific user.
MACs and digital signatures are two widely used cryptographic primitives that
provide guarantee about message integrity and authenticity of origin, respectively. In
MAC systems, sender abd receivers share a secret key. The sender uses their key to
generate a short authentication tag or cryptographic checksum to the message. The
tag is appended to the message and allows the receiver to verify authenticity of the
message. In digital signatures, the signer has a pair of secret and public key and uses
their secret key to generate a digital signature, which is a bit string appended to the
message. A signed message can be verified by everyone using the public key of the
signer. Digital signature guarantee that the message is generated by the signer.
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Security of cryptographic systems relies on the security of cryptographic keys. Key
distribution protocols are an integral part of all cryptographic systems.
Cryptographic schemes, although essential in securing distribution of content but
cannot provide protection against illegal copy and cloning by authorised users.
5.4.2 Digital Watermarking
A digital watermark is a subliminal signal embedded into a file such that it can be de-
tected or recovered only by a party in possession of a secret key [33]. In the context of
intellectual property protection, there are three main ways in which digital watermarks
are used:
• proof-of-ownership, in which the presence of an owner’s watermark is used as
evidence of the owner’s claim to the work;
• fingerprinting, in which each legitimate copy of a published work is given a
distinct watermark, and illicit copies are traced to their source by the presence of
the culprit’s fingerprint; and
• captioning, in which a watermark is used to convey information to a digital rights
management system such as “do not copy this file”.
Many watermarking algorithms have been proposed for still images, video and
audio, in which there is relatively large scope for making small imperceptible changes
to the host material. Fewer algorithms, however, are available for media such as text
and computer software, where there is much more limited scope for altering the host
material.
5.4.3 Content Hashing
A content hash (or robust hash is a characteristic code computed from an audio or video
signal using a function such that (ideally) any two signals will have the same hash if
and only if a human observer would identify the two signals as representing the same
sound or video [21]. Content hashes are also known as acoustic fingerints or video
fingerprints, but we will use the former term to avoid confusion with the watermark
fingerprints described in the previous section.
Content hashes can be computed from a variety of “features” of a signal that vary
between two genuinely different signals, but are not altered by routine signal processing
operations such as compression, format conversion and filtering. Hashes created by
information owners can be used to detect transfers or publications of sensitive signals
even if the signals have been modified prior to transmission or publication.
5.4.4 Broadcast Encryption and Traitor Tracing
Broadcast encryption [52] is a cryptographic technique for providing efficient and se-
cure access to content for an authorised group of receivers. The membership of the
authorised group may change over time, for example, due to users obtaining or can-
celling their subscriptions, or due to user being forcibly ejected from the group for
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mis-behaviour. A message is encrypted by a content key that can be computed from a
group members’s private key together with a message broadcast by the group controller.
Broadcast encryption has obvious applications to key distribution in authorised do-
mains and in conditional access systems, and is also widely used to restrict access to
stored media (notably DVDs) to a set of approved players.
Traitor tracing systems provide protection against illegal copying and cloning of
objects such as software, multimedia content or receiver devices. Protection is usually
by “fingerprinting” the object to make it identifiable in such a way that a colluding
group of users each having a fingerprinted version of the object cannot construct a
new object with the same functionality of the original objects and untraceable to the
colluding group [18, 26].
Broadcast encryption combined with traitor tracing allows the content to be deliv-
ered to the selected group of user (subscribers) while ensuring that that any illegal copy
and redistribution can be traced to the colluding group.
6 Other Issues in Digital Rights Management
6.1 Copyright Exceptions
Copyright regimes typically include exceptions variously known as “copyright excep-
tions”, “fair dealing” or “fair use” that allow users to make copies of a work for limited
purposes without first obtaining the permission of the copyright owner. These excep-
tions include exceptions for making a small number of copies for personal use; making
excerpts for a variety of purposes; and converting the work to another format.
Early digital rights management system made no attempt to allow for fair dealing of
copyright material. While authorised domains now allow for some degree of personal
copying, current digital rights management systems still struggle with fair uses such as
excerpting and format-shifting. Some authors have proposed modifications to existing
rights expression languages that would enable them to support at least some copyright
exceptions [81], but others argue that it is all but impossible to codify legal exceptions
into licences [50, 48]. Other authors have proposed systems in which users seeking to
exercise an exception can
• appeal to an escrow authority [20, 47];
• negotiate for a special licence covering this use [10, 113]; or
• create a copy from which the user can be identified and prosecuted if the copy-
right owner deems the use to be unfair [82, 110].
None of these methods appear to have caught on in commercial systems, however.
6.2 Privacy Concerns
Digital rights management systems are inherently more invasive than traditional meth-
ods of content distribution [49, 27]. Users are generally required to reveal their iden-
tities and/or register their devices in order to access rights-managed content, and busi-
ness models such as subscription and pay-per-play require users or devices to have an
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on-going association with content providers. Although there is a strong security justi-
fication for registration and monitoring, but this will also allow the content providers
to compile a profile for users’ behavior and so breach of users’ privacy.
Of course, many of these issues are not unique to digital rights management and
apply to a wide variety of electronic commerce and other systems. Numerous “privacy-
enhancing technologies” have been developed that attempt to address these issues (see
[97], for example), however in practice other aspects and DRM systems such as inter-
operability and fair use have received wider attention.
6.3 Effectiveness
Opinions on the practical effectiveness of digital rights management systems have
ranged from fears that digital rights management will usher in an era of unbreakable
security that give vendors absolute control over all uses of digital information [8, 55],
to dismissing all attempts at copy protection as doomed to ultimate defeat [95].
Realistically, as in other security systems, developers of digital rights management
systems are engaged in a constant struggle with attackers. Developers may create a
system that is initially thought to be secure, but after some time attackers may find a
method of defeating the system. The developers may find a way of defeating the attack,
only to have the new system defeated by another attack at a later date.
Digital rights management and related systems in the copyright protection arena,
for example, have been subject to some high-profile defeats [73, 74, 89]. These attacks
have generally been defeated by the next version of the system, which itself might be
defeated by a another attack.
Several authors have proposed theoretical models that attempt to predict the be-
haviour of a market for rights-managed content in the presence of digital rights man-
agement systems and attackers. Biddle, et al. argue that “darknets” – notional rights-
free networks into which rights-managed content is leaked due to a successful attack
– are destined to remain a signficant force in content distribution [17]. They conjec-
ture that the ability of a darknet to compete with rights-managed distribution networks
depends on the the relative convenience and efficiency of the two networks, the moral
behaviour of the networks’ customers, and the popularity of the content involved (a
darknet will favour more popular content because the incentive to attack such content
is higher than it is for less popular content). Acquisti makes a similar argument based
on a formal economic analysis [3]. Heileman, et al. use a game-theoretic approach
to compare the outcome of various strategies used by content providers, and suggest
that giving customers a positive incentive not to share content may be an effective, but
currently under-utilised, tool to combat darknets [60].
Singleton uses the history of copy protection in computer games to argue that, even
though such schemes have frequently been defeated, such schemes have nonetheless
been effective in giving an advantages to protected content over unprotected content
[103]. They do this by creating new business models (such as rental models), attracting
greater investment than unprotected models, and by being more responsive to cus-
tomer’s needs than critics of digital rights management often contend.
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6.4 DRM Patents
In additions to its other difficulties, the uptake of digital rights management systems has
been hampered by disputes over the validity and cost of patents in the field. Probably
the most prominent example is the stalled deployment of devices supporting the OMA
DRM standard due to a dispute over licensing fees between the makers of these devices
and the MPEG Licensing Authority, which claims to represent a number of patent
owners in the digital rights management space [80].
While the designers of ODRL intend it to be freely available for any use, Content-
Guard claims to own patents covering the use of rights expression languages to control
the use of digital information [30]. ContentGuard claims they are owed royalties for
the use of ODRL in addition to the use of their own rights expression language. The
designers of ODRL dispute the validity of ContentGuard’s patents [57] but, so far as
we aware, ContentGuard’s claims have never been tested in court.
7 Conclusion
Digital rights management allows access to an information item to be controlled over
the entire lifetime of the item. It has well-established – albeit sometimes controversial
– applications in protecting copyrighted multimedia works and corporate intellectual
property, as well as promising applications in protecting privacy.
Important requirements of DRM systems are inter-operability and usability. This
latter is in particular in the context of fair use and satisfying the need of users in real
life application scenarios such as content sharing with friends. Standardisation which
is an important step towards implementing inter-operable systems has proved a long,
difficult and so far incomplete process. On the other hand designers have found it
difficult to marry the rigid protection afforded by technical security systems with the
convenience that everyday users expect.
The primary approach approach to DRM, that is using a license to describe the
rights of the users and enforcing the license on a DRM agent, is motivated and best
suited for traditional distribution models and in particular distribution of multimedia
content. More complex content distribution systems may include many players, each
having the role of provider and user of content at the same time. The relationship
between these players and distribution of cost and financial gains among these players
may require a careful re-thinking of DRM systems.
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